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LABOR LAW: THE DUTY TO ARBITRATE MATTERS OF
LIFE AND LIMB-THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
CONFRONTS THE SAFETY STRIKE
[Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974),
rev'g 466 F.2d 1157 (1972)].
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States has entered the post-industrial age. For the economic
planners, as well as for the men and women who make up the nation's work
force, the most salient fact of the new age is the domination of economic life
by automation. Yet, paradoxically, the working environment of the
American laborer continues to reflect all of the discomforts and dangers of
the industrial age. The confrontation between the safety-minded workers at
Gateway Coal Mine #127 and the production-minded management of the
Gateway Coal Company' illustrates the moral, economic, and legal dislocations caused by the transition to a post-industrial economy. The as-yet-unresolved legal issues, however, derive not from one private lawsuit between
workers imbued with the new consciousness and management bound up in
2
the old, but rather in a public decision to alter the ecology of the workplace.
Prompted by a congressional investigation which statistically demonstrated the unsafe working conditions daily confronting the American
worker," comprehensive federal legislation was enacted in 19691 and 1970,
acknowledging and establishing as a Congressional and public policy the
1. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW,414 U.S. 368 (1974), rev'g466 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1972).
2. This phrase, as well as the ideas expressed in this introduction, is loosely based upon Marshall McLuhan's theories regarding the consequences of technological change. Cf M. McLUHAN

&

Q. FIORE,

WAR AND PEACE IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE

(1968).

3. S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970).
... 14,500 persons are killed annually as a result of industrial accidents; accordingly,
during the past four years more Americans have been killed where they work than in the
Vietnam war. By the lowest count, 2.2 million persons are disabled on the job each year
resulting in the loss of 250 million man days of work-many more than are lost thru
strikes. Id. (Emphasis added).
See Schaur & Ryder, New Approach to Occupational Safety and Health Statistics, MONTHLY
LAB. REV.,

March, 1972, at 14.

4. Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (1970) as amended
30 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (Supp. 1972). Special legislation was necessary for the coal mining

industry because it is so hazardous. See UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 239 (1972), which reports that injuries suffered by workers in
the coal mining industry result in the highest average number of days of disability per case of
all industrial injuries. The average in 1969 was 174, and in 1970 it increased to 187. The metal
milling and mining industry, which includes the operation of Hanna Mining Company in Minnesota's iron range, had the second highest average of days of disability per case.
5. Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq. (1970).
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importance of on-the-job safety. While these were positive steps, their
initial impact was diminished by the fact that they were taken only in the
wake of a coal mining disaster of unprecedented dimensions. Additionally,
the hopes which were sparked among workers by the enactment of safety
legislation have so far been frustrated by a lack of vigorous enforcement by
those agencies entrusted with its administration. 7 The history of legislative
unresponsiveness and the current executive apathy have caused the American
worker, and the coal miner in particular, to suspect the government's sincerity' when it purports to protect his health and safety on the job and, as
workers continue to be killed and maimed on the job,9 has forced him to conclude that only he is primarily concerned with his on-the-job safety. The
resultant bargaining demands and strikes, organized both by unions enlightened as to their members' desire and need for on-the-job safety and by
isolated groups of workers, 0 involved not only coal miners," but also the
highly paid and highly skilled technicians of the petroleum 2 and automobile
6. Seventy-eight men died in a Farmington, West Virginia, coal mine in 1969. That disaster
provoked the passage in 1970, of a new federal coal-mine-safety law. Newman, In Tragedy's
Wake, The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 26, 1972, at 1, col. 6. See Report of GeneralSubcomni. on
Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, Investigation of the Hyden, Kentucky,
Coal Mine Disaster, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971); Pogson, Federal Health and Safety Laws
Affecting Mining, Milling, and Smelting Operations,17 ROCKY MT. L. INST. 225-26 (1972).
7. Brief for Respondent at43 n.79, Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974):
To put the matter mildly, the U.S. Bureau of Mines has been criticized for lack of vigor
in enforcing the 1969 Act. See, e.g., GAO Report to the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare (No. B-170686, May 13, 1971) (problems
in implementing the 1969 Act); GAO Report to the Subcomm. on Conservation and
Natural Resources of the House Comm. on Govt. Operations (No. B-170686, July 5,
1972) (problems in assessment and collection of penalties under the 1969 Act). Recently
the Bureau's scheme for assessing penalties for safety violations-the very heart of
enforcement-was struck down. NationalIndep. Coal Operator'sAssn. v. Morton, 357
F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C., 1973). Id.
Congressional response to a problem is not enough; the federal administrative agencies responsible for enforcing particular laws must also act.
8. Wall Street Journal, Jan. 9, 1973, at 1, col. 5.
9. For the last 10 years in America, the on-the-job injury rate has been rising. See BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS REPORT No. 406, INJURY RATES BY INDUSTRY, 1970 (1972); BUREAU 01
LABOR STATISTICS REPORT No. 379, INJURY RATES BY INDUSTRY, 1968 (1970).

10. From 1964 to 1970, the number of industrial safety strikes more than tripled. HANDBOOK
OF LABOR STATISTICS, STOPPAGES BY MAJOR ISSUES, Table No. 163, at 338-44 (1972).

I1. In the coal mining industry, the extreme hazards faced by miners make wildcat strikes an
everyday occurrence. See, e.g., Witt, Wildcat Strikes, United Mine Worker's Journal, August
1-15, 1973, at 13, col. 1:
Nineteen year old UMWA miner David White wasn't trying to trigger one of more
than a hundred wildcat strikes which occur every month. He wasn't trying to add to the
loss of thousands of dollars in wages and profits and UMWA Welfare and Retirement
Fund royalties. He wasn't trying to upset the UMWA's drive to make the grievance
machinery work. David White was just trying to stay alive. Id.
12. The Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers International recently struck Shell Oil Company.
The refinery workers sought contrat guarantees that they would be protected from the danger
of fumes at company refineries, and union demands also called for union members on plant
safety committees. These health and safety negotiation issues, not wages, caused the walk-out.
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industries, 3 and Minnesota's taconite industry. 4
The worker's response to the lack of effective enforcement-strikes over
unsafe working conditions-has given rise to a new problem in labor law:
whether labor-management disputes concerning unsafe working conditions
are subject to the broad arbitration and no-strike clauses commonly found in
labor contracts, and whether strikes over unsafe and abnormally dangerous
working conditions may be enjoined in federal court. These issues were
recently considered and decided by the United States Supreme Court,
although the solution it posited in Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mineworkers of America" may have raised more questions than it answered.
The litigation arose out of a safety strike at a coal mine owned by the
Gateway Coal
Company. Three company foremen had falsified records of an
"air check"' 6 to determine the air flow in the underground mine. Work at
Ironically, Shell already has plant workers on safety committees in their European plants. Wall
Street Journal, Jan. 5, 1973, at 13, col. 5: "Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International
Union said its demands that employees be allowed to help determine whether their working conditions are healthful appears to be a major obstacle in concluding labor agreements with many
companies in the petroleum industry." See generally New Allies Among Environmentalists,
SCIENCE, April 13, 1973, at 180; Shell Strike, Ecologists Refine Relations with Labor. BuSNESS WEEK, February 24, 1973, at 86.
13. Car makers in Detroit also discovered that health and safety was important to their employees. The United Auto Workers (UAW) in 1973 contract negotiations made mandatory
overtime the key issue, contending that overtime causes fatigue and thereby increases the danger
of injuries. The auto makers wished to retain the right to contract with their employees for mandatory overtime. See St. Paul Sunday Pioneer Press, Aug. 12, 1973, at 11,col. I :Chrysler employees recently showed dissatisfaction with safety conditions after two employees were injured,
by taking over one of that car manufacturer's stamping plants in Detroit. Minneapolis Tribune,
Aug. 20, 1973, at 7A, col. 2; see Wall Street Journal, March 6, 1973, at 1,col. 5.
14. A wildcat strike over on-the-job safety was faced in Minnesota in 1972, by the Hanna
Mining Company. The factors that led to the walkout were similar to those that led to unrest and
revolt in other mines, plants, and mills: the willingness of management to ignore dangerous conditions and to sacrifice safety for increased production and profit. Numerous safety violations
were complained of by the workers prior to the walkout, but management did not respond.
Employees became more restless as accidents and injuries increased until finally, a series of incidents ignited the walkout. Management sued to enjoin the strike, and the case was brought to
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Hanna Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers, Civil
No. 5-72-59 (D. Minn., June 26, 1972), affd,464 F.2d 565 (8th Cir. 1972).
15. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
16. The air checks were required by the Coal Mine Health & Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C.
§ 863(d)(1) (1970) (originally enacted as Coal Mine Health & Safety Act of Dec. 30, 1969,
Title IlI,
§303, 83 Stat. 767). Section (d)(1) states in part:
Within three hours immediately preceding the beginning of any shift, and before any
miner in such shift enters the active workings of a coal mine, certified persons ... shall
...test by means of an anemometer ... to determine whether the air in each split is
traveling its proper course and in normal volume and velocity ....
.
The Supreme Court noted that although the actual air flow level, I1,000 cubic feet per minute,
was less than half of the normal 28,000 cubic feet per minute, it still exceeded the 9,000 cubic feet
per minute required by federal law and the 6,000 cubic feet per minute required by state law.
414 U.S. at 370-71 n. I. The difference between the air flow required by law and the air flow pres-
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the mine was temporarily halted 7 and repairs to the ventilation system
were made when the reduced air flow was discovered. Subsequently, state and
federal inspectors, at the union's request, inspected the mine, impounded
the records which revealed the falsification, and notified the company that
criminal charges 5 would be brought against the three foremen. One day
after the falsification of the records was discovered, a special union meeting
was held, and the coal miners voted unanimously not to return to work unless
all three foremen were suspended. 9 Gateway acquiesced. The union believed
that the continued employment of the foremen presented a hazard at the
mine because of their demonstrated neglect in enforcing federal and state
safety rules.2 0 While the criminal charges were pending, the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Resources 2 ' notified Gateway it was at
liberty to reinstate the three foremen, and two of the three 21 were rehired.
Eventually, the foremen pleaded nolo contendere to the criminal charges
and were fined 200 dollars each.
Upon the return of the two foremen, the miners struck as they had voted to
do a month and a half earlier. A week after the strike began, the company
offered to arbitrate the dispute, but the union refused, claiming that the collective bargaining agreement did not require it to arbitrate safety disputes.
Gateway then brought an action in federal district court seeking to enjoin the
strike, alleging that the union was required to submit the dispute to arbitration
and was prohibited from striking. The district court found for the company,
ent under normal working conditions may raise questions regarding the efficacy of enforcing
present laws. It may also be indicative of the power of the mine operators in determining the
content of those laws.
17. The miners initially walked out over an economic issue, but when the low air flow halted
work they were ordered to stand by. Management refused to pay those who left the mine in
contradiction of their orders, and the miners voted to walk out until they received their pay for
that day and refused to arbitrate. When, on June 1, 1971, the foremen who falsified the records
returned to work, the economic walkout became a safety strike. 414 U.S. at 371-72.
18. 414 U.S. at 372. The State of Pennsylvania charged the three foremen with falsification
of records, apparently under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§70-523, 701-703, 701-242 (1966).
19. Two of the three foremen were suspended immediately by Gateway, but until the miners
demanded the suspension of all three at their April 18, 1971, meeting, the foreman who reported
the violation was still on the job. 414 U.S. at 371.
20. On several occasions prior to April 15, 1971, the striking coal miners, Local 6330, had
complained that the safety regulations were being disregarded by the foremen. Brief for Respondent at 5 n.2, Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
21. The Gateway Coal Company applied to the Department of Environmental Resources to
allow the three assistant foremen to return to work because the Pennsylvania Legislature had
recently transferred to that Department the power to regulate the coal mining industry in Pennsylvania, a power which had previously been conferred upon the Department of Mines and Mineral Industries, the Secretary of Mines and Mineral Industries, the Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission, the Mine Inspectors' Examining Board for the Bituminous Coal Mines of Pennsylvania, and the Anthracite Mine Inspectors' Board. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 510-1(2) (Supp.
1974).
22. Prior to the reinstatement on June 1, 1971, the third foreman had retired. 414 U.S. at 372.
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ordering arbitration of the dispute and enjoining the strike on the condition
that the two foremen be suspended pending the arbitrator's decision. 3 The
union appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals24 which reversed the
decision of the district court holding that because of the public policy
favoring workers' safety, safety disputes were sui generis and not subject to
arbitration except where specifically provided for in the labor contract.
Finding no such express provision, and instead, finding a clause which it construed to except safety disputes from the general arbitration procedure, the
court ruled that no injunction should issue because the union's good faith
work stoppage over an abnormally dangerous working condition was not a
breach of the contract, and, thus, there was no wrong to enjoin. The injunction
was dissolved and the order to arbitrate dismissed.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 25 and framed the
three issues presented to it thus:
First, did the collective-bargaining agreement then in force between these
parties impose on them a compulsory duty to submit safety disputes to arbitration by an impartial umpire? Second, if so, did that duty to arbitrate give
rise to an implied no-strike obligation supporting issuance of a Boys Markets
injunction? Third, did the circumstances of this case satisfy the traditional
equitable considerations controlling the availability of injunctive relie?,25
The court held that the answer to all three questions was yes, thereby
reversing the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and reinstating the relief
granted by the district court.
II.

GA TEWA Y IN HISTORICALCONTEXT-THE I SSUES RESOLVED

An analysis of the Gateway decision must be grounded upon an understanding of the federal judiciary's role in shaping the rights and remedies of
the parties to labor disputes. Congress granted the federal courts jurisdiction
over all labor disputes, without regard to the ordinary jurisdictional requirements, in 1947.11 That jurisdiction was soon held to include the power to
formulate a body of substantive labor law, based upon the policies expressed
in congressional legislation.2" Two major and seemingly inconsistent con23. Pending appeal following the granting of injunctive relief by the district court, an arbitrator found that the foremen should be allowed to return to their positions in the coal mine and that
their reassumption of safety responsibilities-checking air flow-would not be dangerous and
that the coal miners' contention was without merit. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 466 F.2d 1157,
1159 (3d Cir. 1972).
24. Gateway Coal Co. v. U MW, 466 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1972).
25. 410 U.S. at 953.
26. 414 U.S. at 374.
27. Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
28. In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.448, 456 (1957), the Court said:
We would undercut the Act and defeat its policy if we read § 301 narrowly as only conferring jurisdiction over labor organizations.
The question then is what is the substantive law to be applied in suits under § 301(a).
We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is federal law,
which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws.
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gressional policies 29-protection of the worker's right to strike and encouragement of the arbitration of all labor disputes-have largely determined
the course ofjudge-made labor law.
Congress first recognized the right of employees "to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of ...mutual aid or protection.' 3 These words
were intended to protect the right to strike, a right which forms the backbone
of employees pursuing collective goals in the face of management opposition,
and lends credibility to the employees' bargaining position in negotiation
sessions. Recognizing that management would attempt to undercut the impact of the right to strike by seeking injunctive relief against unions," Congress further protected the workers' rights by denying the federal courts the
power to enjoin strikes. 2 The legal and psychological impact of these provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act were enormous. Not only were employers forced to recognize unions as the bargaining representatives of employees and to carry on negotiations through them, but also employers and
workers were made forcefully aware of a national policy of protecting
3
unions and their right to strike. 1
The second relevant congressional labor policy is to encourage collectivebargaining agreements which require that all grievances be submitted to
binding arbitration.3 4 The United States Supreme Court, in a series of
decisions, gave effect to that policy by creating a near ly conclusive presumption of arbitrability.1-' Each case raised the issue of whether a particular
29. For a thorough discussion of the development of the two conflicting principles see, Note,
Labor Injunctions, Boys Markets, and the Presumption of Arbitrability, 85 HARV. L. REV.
636 (1972).
30. Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
31. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 201 (1930):
In labor cases ...complicating factors enter. The injunction cannot preserve the socalled status quo; the situation does not remain in equilibrium awaiting judgment upon
full knowledge. The suspension of activities affects only the strikers; the employer resumes his efforts to defeat the strike, and resumes them free from the interdicted interferences. Moreover, the suspension of strike activites, even temporarily, may defeat
the strike for practical purposes and foredoom its resumption, even if the injunction is
lifted. Choice is not between irreparable damage to one side and compensable damage
to the other. The law's conundrum is which side should bear the risk of unavoidable
irreparable damage. Improvident denial of the injunction may be irreparable to the
complainant; improvident issue of the injunction may be irreparable to the defendant.
For this situation the ordinary mechanics of the provisional injunction proceeding are
plainly inadequate.
The power and importance of a strike to any labor group can never be fully estimated. As
Frankfurter and Greene indicate, an injunction may have a chilling effect upon a union which
might be irreparable. This observation has as much validity in 1974 as it did in 1930.
32. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101-15 (1970).
33. In the 4 years after passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Wagner Act union
membership doubled. See B. MELTZER, LABOR LAW 9-10 (1970).
34. Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970).
35. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). These cases are commonly known as, and are hereinafter re-
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grievance was included in the general arbitration clause of the applicable
collective-bargaining agreement. Refusing to apply to labor contracts the
rules of construction applicable to contracts generally, 36 the Court determined that congressional policy could best be effectuated by resolving
questions of whether the contracting parties intended to arbitrate a particular
grievance in favor of arbitration. 7 Since the Steelworkers Trilogy, the federal courts have consistently presumed that the parties intend to include all
disputes within a general arbitration clause.38
Since it avoids the ugly specter of a strike, while at the same time allowing
each side to present its case and retain the economic benefits that accrue
when the work force remains on the job, arbitration has become the accepted
manner of settling labor disputes. 39 Yet, for all of its advantages, arbitration
remains fundamentally inconsistent with the right to strike. It can only work
if strikes are somehow limited.
The federal courts were forced to face this inconsistency and to integrate
the two congressional policies of favoring arbitration and protecting the right
to strike into a cohesive body of national labor law. Granting injunctive relief
at the urging of management denied unions their most effective weapon for
economic gains, the strike. Allowing unions to strike at will rendered arbitration clauses meaningless and defeated management's reasons for entering
into arbitration agreements. The right to strike emerged as the prevailing
policy in 1962, when the United States Supreme Court in Sinclair Refining
Co. v. A tkinson'0 upheld Norris-LaGuardia's prohibition against the enjoining of union strikes despite contractual arbitration provisions and no-strike
obligations."' Sinclairdid not attempt to reconcile the two national labor policies, but rather chose the policy of Norris-LaGuardia. Only 8 years later, Sinclair was reversed in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local
177,12 and the federal courts were reinvested with the power to enjoin union
strikes. Observing that the anti-injunctive relief provisions of Norris-LaGuardia, enacted in 1932, arose out of a different labor relations environment
ferred to as, the "Steelworkers Trilogy."
36. Cf United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960).
37. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960); see
Gateway Coal Co. v UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1974). See also Note, Labor Injunctions,
Boys Markets, and the Presumption of Arbitrability,85 HARV. L. REv. 636 (1972) (arguing that
the presumption of arbitrability is neither desirable nor a legal necessity).
38. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 466 F.2d 1157, 1159 (3d Cir. 1972).
39. A no-strike clause of some form appears in 95 percent of all bargaining agreements.
2 N.B.A. COLL. BARG.: NEG. & CON. 77:1(1964). As of 1970 over 90 percent of all bargaining
agreements contained an arbitration clause of some sort. D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 220 (1970).
40. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
41. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), came after Sinclair and gave unions
the right to remove actions for injunctive relief by employers to federal court, thus making statelevel injunctive relief unavailable, and any form of injunctive relief rare.
42. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
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than the Labor-Management Relations Act, enacted in 1947,11 the Court
reasoned that congressional intent to encourage arbitration would be
defeated unless unions were obligated to abide by their contracts with management, particularly binding arbitration provisions and no-strike obligations.44 Management would have no incentive to contract to arbitrate
grievances if unions could strike at will. The Court rejected Sinclair as an
aberration which undermined the well-established presumption that the
parties to a labor contract intended to settle all disputes through the binding
arbitration mechanism provided by the contract's general arbitration
45
clause.
Viewed as a resolution of apparently inconsistent congressional policies,
the holding of Boys Markets is more of an exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act's prohibition against enjoining strikes, rather than an all-out
affirmation of the Labor-Management Act's choice of arbitration as the
favored means of resolving labor-management disputes. The decision
narrowly defines the elements that management must prove and the findings
that the trial court must make before an injunction may issue." First, the
district court must determine that an injunction is appropriate despite the
prohibitions of Norris-LaGuardia; second, the contract must bind both
parties to arbitrate the particular grievance in dispute; third, the contract
must contain an express or implied no-strike clause; and finally, the ordinary
principles of equity must warrant the issuance of an injunction. Clearly, the
burden of proof is on the party seeking the injunction, and its failure to
establish any of the elements should result in the denial of injunctive relief.
The United States Supreme Court framed the issues it was to decide in
Gateway in terms of the Boys Markets formulation, attempting, as courts in
these cases must always do, to strike a balance between the union's right to
strike and its duty to arbitrate. Gateway, however, was unique, for it injected
into the usual equation a third element, the workers' right to safe working
43. Id. at 250-51.
44. Id. at 247-49.
45. Id. at 241.
46. Id. at 254.
"A District Court entertaining an action under § 301 may not grant injunctive relief
against concerted activity unless and until it decides that the case is one in which an
injunction would be appropriate despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act. When a strike is
sought to be enjoined because it is over a grievance which both parties are contractually
bound to arbitrate, the District Court may issue no injunctive order until it first holds
that the contract does have that effect; and the employer should be ordered to arbitrate,
as a condition of his obtaining an injunction against the strike. Beyond this, the District
Court must, of course, consider whether issuance of an injunction would be warranted
under ordinary principles of equity-whether breaches are occurring and will continue,
or have been threatened and will be committed; whether they have caused or will cause
irreparable injury to the employer; and whether the employer will suffer more from the
denial of an injunction than will the union from its issuance." Id. (emphasis in original).
The source of these principles was the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan in Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (1962). Justice Brennan was also the author of the majority
opinion in Boys Markets.
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conditions. Apparently bypassing the initial inquiry of whether injunctive
relief could be appropriate, or assuming that management had met its burden
of establishing that point, the Court focused on whether the union had a duty
to arbitrate a safety dispute, whether the union was under a contractual
obligation not to strike, and whether the equitable considerations supported
the issuance of an injunction.
Turning first to the question of whether there was a duty to arbitrate
safety disputes under the collective bargaining agreement," the Court relied
on the national labor policy which favors arbitration and ruled that the
broad arbitration clause 8 of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement
of 1968, which governed the contractual relations of the parties, was intended
to include safety disputes. 9 The Court reached that result by broadly construing, in accordance with the "presumption of arbitrability," language in
the arbitration clause which purported to include "any local trouble of any
5
kind. 1
The court of appeals had refused to apply the presumption at all, holding
on the contrary, that unless the contract expressly provides otherwise, safety
disputes are presumed not to be subject to arbitration. 1 This determination
that safety disputes are sui generis was, of course, partially based on the
policies expressed in congressional safety legislation, but also, and perhaps
more importantly, on the recognition that safety issues are not normally
among those matters which men will submit to arbitration.5 The Supreme
Court rejected this view for two reasons. First, it observed that the reasons
for favoring arbitration-prevention of industrial strife and its "unhappy
consequences of lost pay, curtailed production and economic instability"were as applicable to safety disputes as to economic ones. 53 Second, like
economic disputes, safety disputes can be better resolved by the arbitrator
because of his special expertise and understanding of labor-management
problems. 4
By applying the presumption of arbitrability, the Court was able to reject
the court of appeals' further finding that safety disputes had been expressly
excepted from the broad arbitration clause. A mine safety clause, 55 which
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

414 U.S. at 374-80.
Id. at 374-75 n.6.
Id. at 379-80.
Id. at 374-80.
466 F.2d at 1159-60.
Id,
414 U.S. at 379.
Id.
(e) Mine Safety Committee

At each mine there shall be a mine safety committee selected by the local union ....
The mine safety committee may inspect any mine development or equipment used in
producing coal. If the committee believes conditions found endanger the life and bodies
of the mine workers, it shall report its findings and recommendations to the management. In those special instances where the committee believes an immediate danger
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provided for a mine safety committee to inform management of any conditions that endangered the lives of the miners and gave the committee the
power to clear the mine in case of an immediate danger, served as a partial
basis of the appeals court's holding that arbitration of safety disputes was
not required under the collective bargaining agreement." This construction
was buttressed by testimony in the district court57 and by the history of the
contract,5 which revealed that the machinery of the broad arbitration clause
had never been used, nor intended for use, in settling safety disputes.
The Supreme Court dismissed this interpretation of the contract in a
footnote.5 9 Arguing that the court of appeals had merely found that the arbitration clause was ambiguous in light of the mine-safety clause, and not that
the latter constituted an express exception to the former, the Supreme Court
determined that the mine safety clause did not expressly except safety disputes from the arbitration provisions, and that any and all ambiguities in the
arbitration clause were, because of the presumption, to be resolved in favor
of arbitration.
The policies on which the Supreme Court relied in deciding to apply the
presumption in favor of arbitration-avoiding economic dislocations and
utilizing the most expert decision maker-may be worthy of advancement,
but there are other, perhaps higher, values to be preserved. The Court failed
to explain how matters of life and death can be arbitrated, how they can be
weighed and measured by an impartial umpire. Further, arbitration, instead
of easing industrial strife and tension, may, through an erroneous decision by
the arbitrator, accelerate it, since mistakes in resolving safety disputes cannot
be corrected at the next bargaining session as can mistakes in resolving economic disagreements. Hands, legs, and lives cannot be renegotiated.
Perhaps the advantages of economic stability and decision-making expertise also implicitly resolved for the Court the Boys Markets threshhold inquiry of whether an injunction would be appropriate despite the ban imposed
exists and the committee recommends that the management remove all mine workers
from the unsafe area, the operator is required to follow the recommendation of the
committee.... National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1968, quoted in Brief
for Respondents at 12 n. 13, Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
56. 466 F.2d at 1159.
57. Id.
58 See Hearings on S. Res. 98 Before the Special Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Public
Lands, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 298, 300 (1947); Hearings on Welfare of Miners before the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 80th Cong., Ist Sess., vol. I at 6-58 (1947). The hearings illustrate the miners' demand for the right to protect their safety through self-help. The testimony
shows that contracts made while the government operated the coal mines permitted self-help in
safety disputes, an approach which differed from that applicable to economic disputes.
59. 414 U.S. at 380 n.10.
Although the Court of Appeals did not state that § (e) was an express exception to the
arbitration clause, it evidently believed that the section created an ambiguity in the
agreement which had to be resolved against arbitrability .... Since § (e) clearly does
not constitute an express exception to the arbitration clause, it follows that the safety
dispute in the instant case must be deemed to fall within the broad arbitration clause. Id.
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on such relief by Norris-LaGuardia, 60 but in embracing those advantages, the
Court failed to address itself to the narrow scope of the Boys Markets injunction" and the Boys Markets caveat that an injunction should not issue in
every case even if the prerequisites are met. 2 Yet, because of the Supreme
Court's finding that the remaining two issues were moot, the eventual outcome of
Gateway rested almost entirely upon the presumption favoring arbitration.
Since the district court's authority to enjoin the work stoppage depended
upon whether the union was under a contractual obligation not to strike, the
Supreme Court next addressed itself to that issue. 3 Because the agreement
did not contain an express no-strike clause,64 the Court was required to deter60. The reason for the Court's failure to answer specifically the question of why an injunction
should issue in spite of Norris-LaGuardia, may, perhaps, be found in its initial determination
that safety strikes are not sui generis. If that is the case, then injunctive relief may be as appropriate as it is in economic strikes. The circuit court did not apply the Boys Markets test because it
felt that Boys Markets was not applicable to safety strikes. The Supreme Court in holding that
the Gateway strike was subject to the considerations of Boys Markets impliedly found that
Norris-LaGuardia did not apply for the reasons that it gave in Boys Markets, i.e., Norris-LaGuardia was not intended to protect unions who were in violation of collectively bargained antistrike agreements.
61. Local 1791, UMW v. McGuire Shaft & Tunnel Corp., 412 U.S. 958, 960-61 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Heretofore, this Court has recognized implicit exceptions to the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act only when there was an unavoidable clash with
other labor legislation. We have stated before that "the Norris-LaGuardia Act's ban on
federal injunctions is not lifted because the conduct of the union is unlawful under some
other, nonlabor statute." The unmistakeable mandate of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is
to preclude the federal courts from interfering with peaceful disputes by resorting to
"objective tests." Although the Economic Stabilization Act affects wages, it isclear to
me that it falls within the area of general economic legislation rather than the narrow
scope of "labor legislation" as that concept is used in prior decisions.
Moreover, even when we have carved out an exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act
to accommodate it with later, more specific labor legislation, we have circumscribed
the courts' discretion to award injunctive relief. In International Association of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 772-73 we stated:
"The Norris-LaGuardia Act ...expresses a basic policy against the injunction
of activities of labor unions ....[T]he policy of the Act suggests that Courts
should hesitate to fix upon the injunctive remedy for breaches of duty owing
under the labor laws unless that remedy alone can effectively guard the plaintiffs right." Id. (citations omitted).
62. 398 U.S. at 253-54: "Nor does it follow from what we have said that injunctive relief is
appropriate as a matter of course in every case of a strike over an arbitrable grievance."
63. 414 U.S. at 380. "The second question is whether the District Court had authority to
enjoin the work stoppage. The answer depends on whether the union was under a contractual
duty not to strike." Id.
64. Although it is not stated by the Court, the absence of a no-strike clause is implicit in their
finding of an implied no-strike obligation. See Brief for Respondent at 20 n.34, Gateway Coal
Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974). In 1947, the agreement between the coal miners and operators contained a clause rescinding all no-strike agreements and specifically protecting the right
of workers to strike over safety issues. The rescission clause of the 1947 agreement was repeated
verbatim in the 1968 agreement. See also UMW v. NLRB, 257 F.2d 211, 216 (D.C. Cir. 1958):
The "legislative history" of the [rescission clause] is interesting and enlightening. The
1941 Appalachian Joint Wage Agreement plainly and expressly contained agreements
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mine whether the duty to arbitrate, which it had previously found, gave rise
to an implied obligation not to strike which would support a Boys Markets
injunction. 65 The Court observed that the right to strike and the duty to arbitrate are "analytically distinct" issues and that, conceptually at least, collective bargaining agreements could contain a broad, mandatory arbitration
clause and yet preserve the right to strike over arbitrable matters. 6 The
efficacy of this distinction, however, is clearly impaired by the narrow scope
of its operation as defined by the Court. Relying on Lucas Flour,67 the Court
found an implied obligation not to strike over arbitrable issues,"8 again rejecting the suggestion that the mine-safety clause expressed a different general intention with respect to safety disputes.69 The Court held that, unless the
agreement expressly reserves the right to strike over an arbitrable matter, the
duty to arbitrate and the duty not to strike should be construed as having
"coterminous application." 7
While not giving the mine-safety clause the effect of a general exception of
safety disputes from the no-strike obligation, the Court did impliedly 7"
recognize that the clause provided the apparatus for a work-stoppage in the
face of an immediate danger.7 2 Continuing its narrow construction of the
not to strike. On July 8, 1947, the National Bituminous Wage Agreement of 1947
was executed. The Taft-Hartley Act, with its section 301 providing for suits by and
against labor unions for breach of contract, had been approved on June 23 of that year.
The 1947 agreement for the first time included a "Miscellaneous" article. Subsection I
of that article rescinded all "no-strike," "penalty," and "illegal suspension of work"
clauses contained in earlier agreements. This was done to remove the danger that the
union might be sued for breach of contract under the new statute. Id.
65. 414 U.S. at 380-82.
66. Id. at 382.
67. Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). This case involved an employer who brought an action in state court for money damages against a union which refused to
bargain in accordance with the arbitration clause in their collective bargaining agreement. The
Supreme Court held that the employer had a cause of action for damages on the theory that an
implied obligation not to strike was the quid pro quo of an arbitration clause. The quid pro quo
analysis was extended in Boys Markets to support the issuance of injunctive relief. The
precedent for that application of the doctrine is unclear, since Sinclair, decided in the same year
as Lucas Flour, denied injunctive relief even though the contract contained an express no-strike
clause. Nevertheless, courts continue to hold that the union's obligation not to strike over an
issue, the implied quid pro quo of management's obligation to arbitrate, will support a Boys
Markets injunction.
68. While the Court does not explicitly so find, it is evident from the Court's reading of
Lucas Flourand the result reached in the case.
69. Similarly rejected was another provision of the agreement which, according to the union,
evidenced the intent to disavow any no-strike obligation. Id. at 384-85 n. 15.
70. Id.at 382. The application of the Lucas Flour rule to cases of this genre raises an
interesting conceptual difficulty not discussed by the Gateway Court. Where a duty to arbitrate
arises as the result of a presumption, the further finding of an implied no-strike obligation clause
is obvious bootstrapping. Applying a presumption on a presumption in this manner may usurp
the right to strike and produce a result which the parties did not intend.
71. Id. at 382-84. The district court first rejected the application of the mine safety section
(e) to these specific facts.
72. Id. The Court refused to delimit the scope of the mine safety section but did recognize
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clause, however, the Court observed that the union had failed to comply
strictly with the mechanism for invoking its provisions.7 3 With Lucas Flour's
quid pro quo analysis at hand, the Court analogized that because the clause
invested the union with such a powerful weapon, management, as part of its
bargain, certainly intended the procedure to be strictly complied with." Thus,
by holding that the work stoppage provisions of the mine safety clause had
not been properly invoked, the Court avoided the issue of whether the
language of the provision was adequate to constitute an exception to the conterminous application rule and permit the union to strike despite its duty to
arbitrate.
Another potential exception to the implied obligation not to strike considered by the Court was Section 502 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act,7" which provides that a good faith work-stoppage occasioned by abnormally dangerous working conditions shall not be deemed a strike. The Court
neatly avoided confronting and resolving the question of whether that statutory provision would permit a work stoppage in the face of a duty to arbitrate
the dispute, by ruling that the district court had mooted the safety issue when
it conditioned the injunction upon the suspension of the two foremen. 7
Nevertheless, the Court recognized the validity of Section 502 and gratuitously defined its proper application in cases of this nature. It implied that the
union must invoke Section 502 as a defense to management's allegations of
its breach of its contractual obligations not to strike, and come forward with
evidence that an "abnormally dangerous condition" exists which has resulted
in the work stoppage.77 The nature of the evidence required, as defined by the
Court, is particularly significant. A finding by the Court that the employees
stopped their work in the good faith belief that an abnormally dangerous
condition existed, will not suffice."' Rather, the union must present ascertainable, objective evidence in support of that belief.79
This evidentiary burden seems unduly harsh in light of the statute's remedial
purpose. The question of whether an abnormally dangerous working condition exists within the meaning of the statute should be determined with
reference to all applicable federal and state health and safety standards and
that since the parties included this section in their contract, it should be considered, if only to be
rejected.
73. Id. at 383-84.
74. Id. Compare the reasoning of the circuit court which found "substantial compliance"
with the procedures outlined in the mine safety section. 466 F.2d at 1159.
75. Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1970): "[Nlor shall the
quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous
conditions for work at the place of employment of such employee or employees be deemed a
strike under this chapter."
76. 414 U.S. at 387.
77. Id. at 385-87. The Court was in agreement with the dissent in the circuif court opinion in
Gateway regarding the application of Section 502. 466 F.2d at 1162.
78. 414 U.S. at 385-86.
79. Id. at 386-87.
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laws and, seemingly, 0 the congressional policy of protecting the worker from
unsafe working conditions. Since Section 502 complements those provisions
of safety legislation which aim at protecting employees who discover that
unsafe conditions exist or that safety standards are not being enforced,"'
proof of a violation of a state or federal health and safety law or standard
should be prima facie evidence that an abnormally dangerous condition
exists. s2 Death or serious injury should not be required to satisfy the union's
burden of proof. The congressional intent is self-evident. Employees may
leave their jobs to preserve life and limb without breaching their collective
bargaining agreements or suffering loss of their jobs. If ascertainable, objective evidence should come to mean actual harm that has resulted from an
on-the-job hazard, that intent would be defeated. The protection of Section
502 should attach upon a prima facie showing of an abnormally dangerous
condition, and only proof of correction of the specific complaint and compliance with all applicable federal health and safety standards and laws should
be sufficient to rebut such a prima facie case.
Had the Supreme Court construed Section 502 in this more liberal manner,
the district court's action in conditioning the injunction upon the suspension
of the foremen would not necessarily have foreclosed further consideration
of the safety question. Upon the union's showing of the foremen's violation of
a safety law, the burden of going forward with the evidence would have
shifted to management, requiring them to establish not that the danger had
temporarily been ameliorated by the district court's action, but rather that
a permanent solution had been found, and that they were now in compliance
with all safety laws and regulations. 3
80. The intent of Congress to protect employees from dangerous working conditions at their

places of employment under Section 502 and the policies of the Federal Coal Mine Health &
Safety Act, and OSHA are identical. All three place the safety and health of the employees
foremost. It seems, therefore, that a violation of the national safety laws should give rise to the
right to stop work under Section 502. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456

(1957). The safety laws for the coal miners and all employees should form a partial basis of the
national labor law. See Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. at 388, 389 (Douglas J., dissenting); Hanna Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers, Civil No. 5-72-59 (D. Minn., June 26, 1972).
81. The Occupational Health & Safety Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1970) protects
employees from discharge or discrimination for the exercise of their rights under the Act,
including seeking the abatement of unsafe or unhealthy conditions at their place of employment.
82. This rule would create certainty. The employer would be encouraged to conform to the
health and safety laws, the unions would be discouraged from bringing frivolous claims, and a
court faced with determining if an "abnormally dangerous condition" existed would have a

starting point for its analysis.
83. The application of the temporary-permanent dichotomy to the facts of Gateway may be

the question. Where the alleged unsafe working condition consists of the presence of foremen
who have been shown to have negligently endangered the workers once and only once, the
appropriate action for insuring the future safety of the workers is not necessarily obvious.
Arguably, the foremen had been sufficiently punished to deter future negligent acts. Moreover,
new foremen chosen by management might be no more conscientious. Perhaps procedural safe-
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Finally, the Court ruled that injunctive relief was appropriate under traditional equitable principles,84 a finding that is a condition precedent to the
issuance of a Boys Markets injunction. The Court relied in part on the district
court finding that Gateway would suffer irreparable harm by the continued
breach of the union's no-strike obligation,85 but, as with its discussion of
Section 502, relied primarily on the fact that the injunction was conditioned
on the suspension of the two foremen thereby remedying, at least temporarily,
the dangerous conditions.8" In so avoiding the necessity of weighing the
respective equities of Gateway and the union, the Court failed to rule on what
certainly is one of the most difficult problems encountered in the application
of Boys Markets principles to Gateway strikes-whether the economic interests of management can be matched, measure for measure, against the
safety interests of the workers.
II1.

THE FUTURE OF SAFETY STRIKES-THE ISSUES LEFT UNRESOLVED

Although the Supreme Court in Gateway may have erred in its attempt to
strike a balance between the favored position of arbitration and the protected status of the right to strike, the most telling criticism that can be
leveled against the decision is not that the Court construed one contract in a
manner apparently inconsistent with congressional intent and the intent of
the parties, but rather that the Court refused to reach and resolve the questions of broader significance. The action of the district court requiring Gateway to suspend the foremen pending the arbitrator's decision was the key to
the Court's avoidance of two of the more difficult issues arising out of the
safety strike: the application of Section 502 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act, and the weighing of the equities required by Boys Markets.
Moreover, by basing its decision on such narrow grounds, the Court deferred a decision of the ultimate question lurking behind those two issues
and every other issue in Gateway, whether the fact that a strike is prompted
by unsafe working conditions has any legal significance.
All three courts which ruled on the facts of Gateway recognized it to be
a safety dispute, but only the circuit court of appeals viewed this as a basis for
distinguishing its legal status from that of a strike arising solely for economic
reasons. The Supreme Court, in what was undoubtedly the most significant
aspect of its decision, disapproved the appellate court's view, thereby declining to integrate a potential third factor-the public and congressional policy
guards to check the future work of the foremen would be a more appropriate solution than
termination. In any event, the solution of this sort of safety hazard is more difficult than in the
usual case. Under the circumstances, the miners' demand that the foremen be terminated might
appear to be a demand for control over mine operations rather than a demand that a condition,
objectively determined to be dangerous and persisting, should be ameliorated.
84. 414 U.S. at 387-88.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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to protect the American worker on the job from unsafe working conditionsinto the body of developing national labor law. On the other hand, the Supreme Court's finding that safety disputes are not sui generis would appear
to be limited to the issue of whether the presumption of arbitrability attaches
to them under a collective bargaining agreement containing a broad arbitration clause.
In ruling that the district court had resolved the safety issues by conditioning the injunction on the suspension of the foremen, 7 the Court remained
locked into economic considerations. It never reached the safety considerations that the third circuit, and arguably Congress, found to be distinct, nor
ultimately the question whether safety strikes are sui generis. Without question, the foremen's suspension resolves the safety issue, but only temporarily.
If the arbitrator's decision is favorable to the company, the foremen will be
returned to the job, as in fact occurred in Gateway, s" and the injunction will
continue, all without a judicial determination of the issues raised by Section
502 or a weighing of the equities. The result is that the Court apparently
invests the arbitrator with the power, or assumes he inherently has the
power, to make determinations with respect to these issues. This result gives
rise to several apparently unanswered questions.
First, is an arbitrator the appropriate decision-maker to determine whether
alleged violations of federal and state safety laws in fact exist? Second, can
an arbitrator determine the contractual rights and duties of the parties to a
safety dispute without usurping the federal courts' power to weigh the equities? Third, can the protections of Section 502 be asserted by the union upon
the return of the foremen to the job to remove the resultant strike from the
scope of the injunction? Finally, will a weighing of the equities ever permit
the issuance of an injunction against a strike in response to abnormally
dangerous working conditions?
Perhaps the extra-contractual remedy provided by Section 502 to workers
faced with abnormally dangerous working conditions should be viewed as an
adjunct of federal health and safety legislation and not as labor-management
relations legislation."9 The broad remedial purpose of this provision, and of
the safety laws themselves, raises serious doubts about whether arbitrators
should be permitted to resolve the threshhold questions of violation of health
and safety standards even where the alleged existence of unsafe working
87. Id. There may be some reason to believe, however, that because of the district court's
conditioning of its injunction on the suspension of the foremen, the Supreme Court found the
Gateway strike to be a safety dispute without safety issues, thus leaving open the question of
whether safety strikes are to be treated differently from economic strikes.
88. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 466 F.2d 1157, 1159 (3d Cir. 1972). The district court
required the suspension of the foremen, pending the decision of the arbitrator. This decision
found that the dispute was arbitrable, that the contention of the miners that the retention of the
foremen with safety responsibilities would be dangerous was without merit, and that the
foremen should be allowed to perform their assigned tasks without interference.
89. 414 U.S. at 385.
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conditions gives rise to contractual grievances. The majority in Gateway
never squarely addressed the question of how the contractual rights and
remedies of the parties may be sufficiently separated from their rights and
duties under federal health and safety laws so that an arbitrator may determine the former without exceeding his authority and resolving the latter as
well. Indeed, the majority may have tacitly assumed that the arbitrator's
power legitimately extends to interpreting federal health and safety laws.
A more convincing view, as suggested by the dissent in Gateway and by
a Minnesota federal district court,9 is that in matters of life and death,
Congress did not intend the arbitrators to make the final decision. Perhaps
similar reasoning formed a partial basis for the court of appeals' determination in Gateway that safety grievances should not be subject to the decision of
an arbitrator.9 2 Dissenting in Gateway, Justice Douglas would have ruled that
the field of coal mine health and safety had been pre-empted by congressional
enactment of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. 93 Congress, he
observed, intended its administration, construction, and enforcement be
delegated to the administrative and judicial branches of government, where
these functions are traditionally found.94 In Hanna Mining Co. v. United
States Steelworkers of America,95 one federal district court, recognizing
that the arbitrator's function is to determine the rights and remedies afforded
the parties by the contract and not their legal rights under federal health and
safety laws, observed that it may be beyond an arbitrator's power to consider
alleged violations of federal and state laws irrespective of whether these
violations serve as the basis of contractual breaches.
The role of the State of Pennsylvania in determining whether the Gateway
foremen had violated state safety laws offers an instructive example. The
foremen were suspended only after criminal charges had been brought against
them in state court, and they were reinstated only after the criminal cases
had been resolved with the appropriate state regulatory agencies. The federal
government played no similar role with respect to the alleged violations of
federal safety laws. A parallel procedure, and better distribution of decision
making powers, could be achieved in such cases if the Federal Bureau of
Mines under the Secretary of the Interior" or other appropriate federal
agency were to determine if management had violated the specific provisions
of federal law alleged. In light of that factual determination the arbitrator
could by reference to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and by
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
§811.

Id. at 394 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Hanna Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers, Civil No. 5-72-59 (D. Minn., June 26, 1972).
466 F.2d at 1160.
414 U.S. at 394 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id.
Hanna Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers, Civil No. 5-72-59 (D. Minn., June 26, 1972).
Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. § 804(c) (19701. See also id.
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adjusting the interests of the parties resolve the safety dispute without resorting to an interpretation of federal safety laws.
Even the power to determine contractual remedies upon an administrative
determination of the facts, however, gives the arbitrator ultimate control over
the health and safety of the workers. In adjusting the interests of labor and
management, and so resolving their dispute, the arbitrator must take into
account the equities in much the same manner as a federal district court
attempting to determine whether a Boys Markets injunction should issue.
Boys Markets, in enumerating the findings that the trial court must make
before granting injunctive relief, makes no reference to the questions reserved
for decision by the arbitrator.97 Perhaps the possible overlap between the
equitable issues to be decided by the court and those to be decided by the
arbitrator in conciliating the underlying dispute was considered irrelevant
because the strike in that case arose out of economic rather than safety
disputes.
Although economic disputes may present the arbitrator with difficult
equitable issues, safety disputes require the balancing of the most significant
of all interests. To the extent that Gateway implies that the arbitrator's decision regarding the reinstatement of the foremen would be final, it imbues
him with apparent authority to determine whether management's interests
in efficient operation outweigh the workers' interests in protecting their
physical safety. That, of course, is an aspect of the underlying policy issue
that the Supreme Court was asked to resolve. Its refusal to do so, and its
holding that the district court's injunction had "eliminated any safety issue" 98
from the case, leaves arbitrators in such cases with no judicial guidance as to
whether Congress intended that safety disputes be resolved in a manner distinct from that in which purely economic issues are arbitrated.
The ultimate irony is that the Supreme Court, despite its abdication of
judicial authority in Gateway, did not truly avoid, but merely deferred, judicial consideration of the equitable issues presented by safety strikes. The
Court's assumption that an abnormally dangerous working condition could
no longer exist in light of the temporary suspension of the foremen virtually
assured the return of safety strike cases to the federal courts. While stating
that the duty to arbitrate does not always give rise to the obligation not to
strike, 9 and implicitly recognizing that a work stoppage under Section 502
of the Labor-Management Relations Act may constitute an exception to the
coterminous application rule, the Supreme Court stopped short of holding
that only a federal court may determine the validity of a Section 502 work
stoppage, and thus may have created the inaccurate impression that the arbitrator's decision could somehow determine the existence of an abnormally
dangerous working condition within the meaning of that section.
97. 398 U.S. at 254.
98. 414 U.S. at 387.
99. Id.at 382.
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The injunctive relief granted by the district court and reinstated by the
Supreme Court would remain in effect even after the arbitrator's decision.
Thus, if the arbitrator were to return the foremen to the job'00 the union would
undoubtedly stop work and attempt to raise Section 502 in defense to the
allegation that it was in violation of the Boys Markets injunction. At that
point, the federal district court would be squarely faced with the question of
whether the presence of the foremen constituted such an abnormally dangerous working condition that the work stoppage was outside the scope of
the injunction. The trial court could not evade that issue by finding that the
union was collaterally estopped by the arbitrator's decision from raising the
defense of abnormally dangerous working conditions, for, by the Supreme
Court's own admission, Section 502 in excepting certain work stoppages
from the definition of a strike also removes the disputes that give rise to
them from the scope of the arbitration clause of the collective bargaining
agreement.' Thus, the issue of abnormally dangerous working conditions,
for purposes of Section 502 at least, is outside of the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and must in the end be resolved by a federal district court, and the very
safety issue supposedly eliminated by the terms of the district court's injunction must again arise. The federal courts will again be urged to issue
Boys Markets injunctions against safety strikes and will then be required
to address themselves to the equitable issues left unanswered in Gateway.
Boys Markets requires a three-fold consideration of traditional equitable
principles:' 2 1)is the breach of the contract continuous in nature, 2) will the
breach cause irreparable harm to the employer, and 3) will the employer
suffer more from the refusal to grant the injunction than the union will if
the injunction is granted? The first two tests present little difficulty, even with
respect to safety strikes. The third, however, involves some difficult conceptual and practical problems, and Gateway offers little guidance in how they
are to be resolved.
What is clear is that the courts must turn to Congress for guidance and
integrate the emerging public policy of protecting the American worker from
unsafe working conditions with the established policies of protecting the right
to strike and encouraging the arbitration of disputes. Because of its relevance
to the equitable issues the language chosen by Congress to express its decision to protect the workers' safety bears repeating.
The Federal Coal Health and Safety Act 0 3 states "Congress declares that
the first priority and concern of all in the coal mining industry must be the
health and safety of its most precious resource-the miner."' '0 Although this
100. In Gateway the foremen were permitted to return to work pursuant to a decision of a
state regulatory agency even before the arbitrator had rendered his decision. Id. at 372.
101. Id. at 385.
102. Language quoted at note 46 supra.
103. Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C.
801 el seq. (1970) as
amended 30 U.S.C.§§ 901 etseq. (Supp. 1972).
104. Jd. §801(a).
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act applies only to the coal mining industry, which is especially hazardous,
the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 197010 contains parallel language:
The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy ... to assure so far as
possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
working conditions and to preserve our human resources.
-(I) by encouraging employers and employees in their efforts to reduce the
number of occupational safety and health hazards at their places of employment ..... ,0
This legislation imposes upon employers an affirmative duty to provide
their employees with safe working conditions. Further, by specifically
protecting workers who seek federal inspections or report violations of health
and safety standards, 07 Congress has encouraged the American worker to
take affirmative action to make his place of employment safe. If congressional
intent is not to be discounted, the factor of unsafe working conditions must be
given equal consideration with the policies of arbitration and the right to
strike by the courts in their balancing of the competing interests of labor
and management. Recognition of these policy considerations will greatly
simplify the balancing process.
When strictly economic interests are involved they can be reduced, for
purposes of weighing them one against the other, to dollars and cents.' Safety
strikes inject a new interest into the balance-the employee's interest in his
physical well-being. It is difficult to conceive of an adequate equation for
weighing the loss of dollars against the loss of life and limb. The miner who
loses a leg or his life suffers an irreparable harm which cannot be measured
and for which exists no adequate remedy at law.'0 9 While monetary damages
in the form of workmen's compensation or life insurance can never be a
remedy for lost lives and limbs, the money damages which management can
recover from the union for violations of the contract will at least partially
compensate the purely economic losses it may suffer. When Hanna Mining
Company was struck, the district court in Minnesota found that the miners'
safety overrode the economic interests of the Company." 0 The court found it
conceptually impossible to equate, for purposes of balancing the equities,
105. Occupational Health & Safety Act of 1970,29 U.S.C. §651 etseq. (1970).
106. Id.§651.
107. Id. § 660(c); Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. § 820(b)
(1970).
108. See National Presto Indus., Inc. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (discussion
of apportioning money damages). See also Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed CompromiseThe Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 750 (1964).
109. While courts and legislatures have through wrongful death, workmen's compensation,
and similar acts, permitted dependents of a decedent to recover compensation of losses, the
remedies are only of value to the survivor. Assigning a dollar value to human life is a nineteenth
century concept and is based upon the economic value of a person while he is alive. See, e.g.,
DeVito v. United Air Lines, 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951) (hearing an appeal from a $300,000
wrongful death jury verdict, the court valued the life of the decedent at no more than $160,000);
Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960) (the "value" of a child).
110. Hanna Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers, Civil No. 5-72-59 (D. Minn., June 26, 1972).
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economic injury and physical injury."' The court of appeals' ruling that
the Gateway safety strike was sui generis was based in part on its difficulty
in equating these interests." 2 Certainly, the proper application of the Boys
Markets equitable principles is not foreclosed by the Gateway decision,"' and
it would appear that whenever a court is satisfied that the safety of the
workers is in jeopardy, the balance must be struck in favor of refusing to
grant an injunction until the safety hazard is removed.
IV.

CONCLUSION-THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GA TEWA Y

Gateway marks the first consideration by the United States Supreme Court
of a labor case dealing directly with safety strikes and their legal role in the
national labor policy."' The facts in every case are crucial and the Gateway
facts were not, unfortunately, conducive to a thorough consideration of the
issues raised by a safety strike. The particular facts, and especially the district court's decision to suspend the foremen pending arbitration, did not
focus the case on safety issues, but instead allowed those issues to be submerged in contracts, statutes, and stare decisis. Perhaps that result was inevitable. The dangers facing the miners were speculative and remote from an
objective, legal view. A mine explosion does much more for mine safety than
an act of common sense."' Despite the union's protests, the facts showed
little danger, and the majority could easily have seen the case as that of a union
trying to dictate to mangement who should be hired as foremen. The
suspension of the foremen cinched the case, turned attention away from their
criminal acts and criminal convictions to their suspension, and made the
prospect of injury to the workers seem speculative and remote. The reality of
danger, so necessary to present the equities, was not present; no one was hurt.
Nevertheless, some legal principles can be gleaned from the Gateway holdI11. Id. at 7.
On the other hand, the granting of an injunction could irreparably injure the employees
of the plaintiff. The fact that there may be substantial safety and health problems at the
Hanna mines is sufficient to warrant this conclusion. On the one hand, the Court is presented with a situation where the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate by clear evidence
that it will be irreparably injured if the injunction does not issue, and on the other, with
a likelihood that there will be injury or damage as a result of current safety and health
conditions at the Hanna properties, if the injunction does issue. The balancing of a
conjectural injury to the company with a potential injury to the company's employees is difficult to evaluate, primarily because of the difficulty in equating economic
injury with physical safety. Id. (emphasis added).

112. 466 F.2d at 1160. "Considerations of economic peace .. have little weight here. Men
are not wont to submit matters of life and death to arbitration and no enlightened society encourages, much less requires, them to do so." Id.
113. Because the Court found no safety issues present, the Gateway holding does not determine how the weighing of the equities which Boys Markets called for should be applied to
safety strikes. See 414 U.S. at 387-88.
114. Gateway is the first Supreme Court case to consider the right to strike and the duty to
arbitrate in conjunction with a safety strike and not an economic strike. See 41 U.S.L.W.
3382 (questions presented).
115. See authorities collected note 6 supra.
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ing. The "presumption of arbitrability" applies to safety strikes; in that
respect strikes over safety issues will not be treated as sui generis. Arbitration
clauses are to be broadly construed, and the "presumption of arbitrability"
includes the presumption that safety disputes are subject to broad arbitration
clauses. The policy of encouraging arbitration extends to favoring the arbitration of safety disputes on the dual theories that the parties under contract
intended to arbitrate and that this is the best method of settling such disputes.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the arbitration and mine safety
clauses in the Gateway contract suggests to unions and negotiators how future contracts must be written to exempt safety disputes or any other issue
from the contract's general arbitration machinery. Because of the Gateway
application of the "presumption of arbitrability," a union which wishes to
contract to arbitrate, and at the same time retain a right to strike over unsafe
working conditions, should explicitly and particularly so state in the arbitration clause. Since the Supreme Court interpreted the balance of the contract
as subject to the arbitration clause, arguing that an arbitration clause is the
quid pro quo for a no-strike clause, the only alternative which will enable a
union to retain the right to strike is to have no arbitration clause at all. That
is hardly a desirable alternative since it would force many industries and
unions away from the middle ground of arbitration, not only with respect to
safety issues, but other issues as well.
Even though it decided that the union had no right to strike under the contract, the Supreme Court's consideration of Section 502 as an exception to
the implied obligation not to strike offers new hope to unions and workers
wishing to use self-help to make their work places safe. Since the rights arising
under the Labor-Management Relations Act are not subject to the terms of
collective-bargaining agreements, employees will be protected from loss of
jobs and the union from actions for money damages. Regardless of contractual obligations, safety strikes are permissible if "abnormally dangerous
conditions" can be proved.
Section 502 seems to provide the most promising avenue of attack upon
dangerous, unsafe, and unhealthy working conditions in light of Gateway's
failure to confront the equitable issues inherent in a safety strike by finding
that safety questions were no longer involved. The strongest argument for
finding safety strikes sui generis rests on the inequity of forcing men and
women to work in fear of life and limb.
It remains unclear whether the Supreme Court, if faced with a clear case of
harmful and hazardous working conditions, would focus on the equities in
terms of life and death. Indeed, whether Gateway was even a safety strike
decision is uncertain. If, instead, the case involved a safety strike without
safety issues, then the Court's abdication of its power to decide the safety
issues must be predicated on the notion that arbitrators are specialists with a
Solomon's wisdom. The underpinning of the Court's decision finding safety
strikes arbitrable is the reliance upon the neutral umpire to resolve the issues.
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Whether he is technically capable and legally empowered to find a solution is
not the core problem. No matter how expert the arbitrator, the real issue is
whether the stakes are not so high that only the workers themselves have the
right to make the final decision.
The ecology of the workplace is a daily concern of millions of Americans
who are trying to improve it. American workers and unions, the Congress of
the United States, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals have been enlightened that the "ecology of the workplace" is not merely economic. It is to be
hoped that the Supreme Court will remember the words of Justice Frankfurter when considering the next strike over on-the-job safety: "Wisdom too
often never comes and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes
too late."''
116. Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595,600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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